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Abstract
The publication of fake reviews by parties with vested interests has become a severe problem for con-
sumers who use online product reviews in their decision making. To counter this problem a number of
methods for detecting these fake reviews, termed opinion spam, have been proposed. However, to date,
many of these methods focus on analysis of review text, making them unsuitable for many review systems
where accompanying text is optional, or not possible. Moreover, these approaches are often computationally
expensive, requiring extensive resources to handle text analysis over the scale of data typically involved.
In this paper, we consider opinion spammers manipulation of average ratings for products, focusing on
differences between spammer ratings and the majority opinion of honest reviewers. We propose a lightweight,
effective method for detecting opinion spammers based on these differences. This method uses binomial
regression to identify reviewers having an anomalous proportion of ratings that deviate from the majority
opinion. Experiments on real-world and synthetic data show that our approach is able to successfully
identify opinion spammers. Comparison with the current state-of-the-art approach, also based only on
ratings, shows that our method is able to achieve similar detection accuracy while removing the need for
assumptions regarding probabilities of spam and non-spam reviews and reducing the heavy computation
required for learning.
Keywords: anomaly detection, binomial regression, classification, online product reviews, opinion spam,
review spam
1. Introduction
Online product reviews, reporting others experience with a given product, can be extremely useful
for consumers making purchasing decisions. Given the bounty of choice available in online stores, product
reviews provide a helpful aid for consumers attempting to gauge product quality and decide between different
brands and different product models. However, in recent years, opinion spam, consisting of fake reviews
published by individuals with vested interests, has become a major problem for consumers (Jindal and Liu,
2008; Kugler, 2014; Heydari et al., 2015). Opinion spam typically involves the publication of fake product
reviews for the explicit purpose of influencing a buyers’ perceptions of quality and utility (Jindal and Liu,
2008; Kugler, 2014). By publishing numerous fake reviews, opinion spammers attempt to artificially inflate
consumers’ confidence that previous buyers are satisfied with their purchase. Alternatively, spammers
may attempt to create an artificial belief that previous buyers of a competitors’ product have come to be
dissatisfied with their purchase.
Previous approaches to detecting opinion spam have tended to focus on analysis of review text (see
Heydari et al. (2015) for a comprehensive survey of existing methods). These approaches rely on the
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identification of duplicated passages of text occurring in multiple reviews (e.g. Jindal and Liu (2008);
Lau et al. (2011); Mukherjee et al. (2012, 2013)), or consider multiple text-based features, using manually
identified opinion spam to train classifiers (e.g. Ott et al. (2011); Li et al. (2011); Ramkumar et al. (2010);
Fusilier et al. (2014)). While these text-based approaches have been used with success, they suffer three ma-
jor drawbacks (Akoglu et al., 2013). First, detection of repeated text requires expensive comparisons, and
without first narrowing down the selection of candidates the number of comparisons required may quickly
become infeasible. Second, new training data is often required for different product domains (e.g. hardware
products vs restaurant reviews), and third, manual identification of opinion spam for use in training can be
an expensive and time-consuming undertaking. Moreover, many rating systems in use today require only a
rating (typically expressed as a binary good/bad or as 1− 5 stars), with a text-based review optional (e.g.
the Apple App Store), or not possible at all (e.g. the Facebook ‘like’ system). Thus, there is a need to
develop methods for detecting opinion spam based solely on ratings (Akoglu et al., 2013).
Many online shopping services display the mean rating for available products, and this has been shown to
be a key piece of information used by consumers in making their purchasing decisions (Chevalier and Mayzlin,
2006). Thus, one way in which opinion spammers attempt to alter consumers’ perception of quality is to
manipulate the mean rating for a target product. By generating multiple reviews that appear to have orig-
inated from different users, spammers are able to significantly distort the mean rating (Akoglu et al., 2013;
Mukherjee et al., 2012). However, in doing so, spammers are often required to post ratings that are at odds
with those of honest reviewers, and consequently opinion spammers can be expected to have an abnormal
number of reviews that significantly differ from the mean rating.
In this paper we propose a novel method for detecting opinion spammers attempting to manipulate mean
ratings. This method significantly differs from previous approaches in two main ways. First, our method
characterises reviewer behaviour in a manner that allows detection of opinion spammers using only ratings,
without resorting to text-based analysis. Second, we fit a binomial model to the target set of reviews,
and identify spammers as those reviewers exhibiting anomalous behaviour under this model. Consequently,
our method accurately reflects the observed patterns of reviewer behaviour for the particular system under
consideration, rather than relying on assumed parameter values describing this behaviour.
To demonstrate the utility of our approach we conduct experiments using both real and synthetic data,
showing that our method can successfully identify opinion spammers. We compare our approach with the
FraudEagle algorithm presented in (Akoglu et al., 2013), which is also capable of detecting opinion spammers
based only on ratings. FraudEagle has previously been shown to outperform alternative approaches and can
therefore be considered the current state of the art for detection of the type of spammer discussed in this
paper. Using a combination of real and synthetic data we demonstrate that our approach is able to achieve
a similar level of performance to FraudEagle while providing a conceptually deeper, but computationally
simpler, characterisation of spammer behaviour.
2. Related Work
Previous approaches for detection of opinion spam have typically involved supervised or unsupervised
learning based largely on text-based features (Heydari et al., 2015). While many of these approaches include
some non-text-based features, the major focus to date has been on features such as n-gram counts and cosine
similarity. Using these types of features, a wide variety of supervised and semi-supervised classifiers have
been described (Li et al., 2011; Ott et al., 2011; Lim et al., 2010; Fusilier et al., 2014). These classifiers are
able to successfully identify spam with a high degree of accuracy, however, in order to perform required
training, these studies rely on manual labelling of reviews by domain experts, which is a time-consuming
and costly endeavour.
To overcome the difficulties associated with manual labelling, an unsupervised approach has been pro-
posed that applies an unsupervised Bayesian framework to detection of opinion spammers (Mukherjee et al.,
2012, 2013). In this framework, the spamicity of each reviewer is modelled as a latent variable in a hier-
archical model including both text- and non-text-based features. Experiments with real data sets showed
that this approach is able to accurately identify opinion spammers, with posterior analysis suggesting that
discrimination between spammers and non-spammers is largely driven by text-based features. However, we
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note that this posterior analysis also showed that rating deviation was an important aspect of spammer be-
haviour, and suggested that rating deviation may be more useful in separating spammers from non-spammers
than consideration of early reviews and reviews consisting of extreme ratings.
While the vast majority of previous work has focused on text-based features, one exception is the
FraudEagle algorithm (Akoglu et al., 2013), which has been shown to successfully detect of opinion spammers
using only product ratings. The FraudEagle algorithm uses a graph-based representation of the product-
review system, with reviews represented as edges between reviewers and products. FraudEagle applies an
iterative approach to spammer detection, whereby the inter-dependency between perceived product quality
and the spamicity of reviewers is resolved by updating scores for a given vertex, and then propagating this
update along edges in the graph, converging when the scores for each vertex becomes consistent with its
neighbours’ scores. A similar approach is also proposed in Wang et al. (2012), however this study deals with
reviews of retail stores, which can change in quality over time, requiring the timing of reviews to be taken
into account by the detection algorithm.
In detecting opinion spammers, the FraudEagle algorithm relies on a set of parameters describing the
different behaviour of honest reviewers and spammers. These parameters are difficult to estimate a priori,
and are consequently set to arbitrary values (Akoglu et al., 2013). In this paper we take a significantly
different approach to that of FraudEagle, which eliminates the requirement for these parameters, and does
not require a graph representation of the system. Instead a binomial model of reviewer behaviour is fit to
the target set of product ratings, resulting in a more accurate representation of reviewer behaviour, and at
the same time greatly reducing the computational requirements.
In addition to those works focusing on opinion spam, related work is also found across a wide range of
problem domains through the shared use of statistical anomaly detection. For example, statistical anomaly
detection has previously been employed for detecting unusual movement in crowds (Kratz and Nishino,
2009), network intrusion (Eskin, 2000), spam phone calls through VoIP (Jung et al., 2012), and threats
to operating system security (Kruegel and Vigna, 2003). A comprehensive review of anomaly detection in
general is given in Chandola et al. (2009), with statistical anomaly detection discussed alongside alternative
methods. Similar approaches are also discussed by Markou and Singh (2003) in their review of statistical
novelty detection.
Our approach to detection of opinion spam focuses on deviation from the majority opinion. As we
will discuss in section 3, we use the mean rating as a measure of majority opinion, as this is the measure
most often shown to consumers. However, alternative measures of majority opinion have previously been
studied in the context of decision making and decision theory (see for example Pasi and Yager (2006) and
Van´ıcˇek et al. (2009)).
3. Detection of opinion spammers through consideration of majority opinion
The proposed method for detecting opinion spammers stems from two overarching assumptions regarding
reviewer behaviour. (1) The majority of reviews are posted by honest reviewers, and as a consequence,
distributions taken over large samples of the reviewer population will overwhelmingly reflect the behaviour
of honest reviewers. (2) Honest reviewers will typically have similar expectations and perceptions of quality,
such that the set of reviews for a given product will tend to exhibit a small degree of variance.
We take assumption 1 as given, since if this is not the case then the whole system of online peer reviews
is completely broken. As justification for assumption 2, Figure 1 shows the distribution of the standard
deviation, and also the maximum deviation from the mean rating over approximately 272,000 products
reviewed in the Amazon online store. For the majority of products, review scores appear to be relatively
tightly clustered around the mean, rather than spread across the possible range of 5 stars.
Based on Figure 1, we suggest honest reviewers tend to come to a similar opinion about a product, so
that reviews that disagree with the mean rating will be relatively infrequent. Clearly such reviews may exist
for legitimate reasons, for example the purchaser may happen to receive a defective version of an otherwise
quality product, or a particular book or film generates a highly polarised response. However, it is unlikely
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Figure 1: Distribution of maximum and standard deviation from the mean rating for the Amazon data set.
that the same purchaser will consistently receive faulty models or review polarising products, therefore, we
suggest that having a high proportion of reviews that disagree with the mean rating can be considered as a
strong indicator that a reviewer may be a spammer.
Consider a product p targeted by an opinion spammer (or a group of opinion spammers), who wishes
to influence the average rating of the product. In manipulating the average rating, the spammer attempts
to create an overall perception of either satisfaction or dissatisfaction on the part of previous purchasers.
Assuming a 5-star rating system, we can model this manipulation by taking the midpoint rating λ = 3, and
assuming that products having a mean rating σp ≥ 3 will be perceived as good while those having σp < 3
will be perceived as bad. The spammers objective is to drive the mean rating in a particular direction so that
the product in question will be perceived as good or bad by prospective purchasers. For a given reviewer
r, a published rating σr,p can be considered as agreeing (σr,p ≥ 3 and σp ≥ 3 or σr,p < 3 and σp < 3) or
disagreeing (σr,p ≥ 3 and σp < 3 or σr,p < 3 and σp ≥ 3) with the majority opinion. Note that while we
assume a 5-star system, our method could equally be applied to a binary system, taking λ = 0.5 as the
midpoint and considering a mean rating σp ≥ 0.5 indicative of a good product and σp < 0.5 as indicative
of a bad product. Depending on the particular situation, we may also elect to set λ to an alternative value.
For example, we might consider λ = 3.5 to more accurately represent the point where consumers become
far more likely to purchase particular products. Alternatively, we may assume that spammers are willing to
post ratings of 3-stars in order to negate 5-star ratings of a product, attempting to drag the mean rating
down without being too obvious. In this case, we may elect to use λ = 4 so that these types of spammers
would still be detected.
In this paper we consider mean rating as our measure of majority opinion. This is because the mean
rating is displayed to consumers in many online stores (e.g. Amazon, Apple App Store, Google Play, see also
Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006)). We therefore reason that spammers’ manipulation of consumer perception
requires them to alter the mean rating. For a particular situation, consideration of alternative measures,
such as the median rating, may be beneficial. As described below, our approach considers a weighted mean,
thus alternative measures that can be naturally weighted may be substituted for the mean in the approach
described in this paper.
Using the rating model outlined above, we can determine the proportion of reviews for a given reviewer r
that disagree with the mean rating for their respective products. Whether or not we consider this proportion
to be excessively high depends on how often we expect a random honest reviewer to post such a review.
Since the overwhelming majority of reviewers are assumed to be honest, an estimate of this frequency can
be easily calculated from the available data by simply considering the proportion of reviews that disagree
with the mean rating across all available observations φ = nD/n. Taking φ as the probability that a random
review σr,p will disagree with the mean, we can estimate the spamicity for each reviewer using a binomial
distribution.
A binomial distribution models the outcome of independently repeating a random process a set number
of times, where the random process results in a binary value success or failure. The distribution can
be used to determine whether or not the observed proportions of success and failure across the repeated
trials differ significantly from the expected proportions, given a known probability of obtaining success.
In applying the binomial distribution to opinion spam, we treat the number of reviews posted by a given
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reviewer nr as the number of trials, and the number of reviews that disagree with the mean rating kr as the
number of trials having an outcome sucess. We then calculate the probability ψr of observing kr or more
disagreeing reviews out of nr by random chance alone, taking φ as the probability of success.
ψr = P (X ≥ kr;nr, φ)
= 1− P (X < kr;nr, φ)
=
kr−1∑
i=0
(
nr
i
)
φi(1 − φ)nr−i
We can consider ψr to be a measure of the reviewers honesty. A value of ψr that is close to one indicates that
the proportion of disagreeing reviews is within the expected bounds, while a value close to zero indicates
that the proportion of disagreeing reviews is unexpectedly high. An estimate of the reviewers spamicity can
then be calculated as sr = 1− ψr.
In calculating the number of reviews that disagree with the majority it is important to remember that
the mean rating reflects both the contributions by honest reviewers, and the deliberate manipulations by
spammers. If a spammer successfully drives the mean rating above or below the midpoint, then honest
reviewers would appear to disagree with the majority opinion, and may consequently be considered by the
algorithm as candidate spammers (Akoglu et al., 2013; Wu et al., 2010). To correct for this situation, we
can apply an iterative process whereby the contribution from each reviewer to the average rating for each
product is successively reduced based on their proportion of non-majority reviews.
The iterative process used for correcting mean ratings begins by assuming that all reviewers are honest, and
defining ur,i to be an estimated measure of whether reviewer r is honest (i.e. not a spammer) derived from
the ith iteration. For each reviewer we initialise ur,0 = 1. In each iteration i > 1 the mean rating σp,i for
each product p is calculated as a weighted arithmetic mean, with the contribution of each rating weighted
using the values of ur,i−1 from the previous iteration. Using this updated mean rating, the weights for the
next iteration ur,i are calculated as ur,i = 1 −
dr,i
nr
where dr,i refers to the number of reviews for reviewer
r that disagree with the weighted mean rating for the respective products in iteration i and nr is the total
number of reviews published by that reviewer. The iterative process stops when a maximum number of
loops have occurred or the observed change in the proportion of non-majority reviews becomes less than
some threshold τ for all reviewers. Once the iterative process is complete, a binomial test is applied to each
reviewer as described above.
For the experiments described in this paper, we set the threshold parameter τ = 1 × e−5 and used a
maximum number of 10 iterations. We found that 10 iterations was enough for the algorithm to effectively
correct mean ratings, and often converged well before reaching this maximum. However, in some situations,
updating the estimated honesty score for a small number of reviewers caused the weighted means of some
products to flip back and forth from > 3 to < 3. Consequently, the proportion of reviews that disagree with
the majority did not converge for these reviewers, and the maximum number of iterations was reached.
A step-by-step description of our approach is given as Algorithm 1. Lines 3 − 13 relate to the iterative
process used to correct the mean rating. Lines 5−7 calculate the weighted mean for each product, and lines
9− 12 calculate the proportion of reviews that disagree with this updated mean. Lines 15− 18 relate to the
assignment of a spamicity score using the binomial test.
The presented algorithm scales linearly as a function of the number of reviewers and the number of
reviews, O(imax(nreviews + nreviewers) + nreviewers), where imax is the number of iterations completed. Al-
though we calculate the mean rating for each product, the total number of operations is dependent on the
number of reviews for each of these products, thus this part of the algorithm scales with the number of re-
views. We then calculate the proportion of non-majority reviews, so that the number of operations depends
on the number of reviewers. Since we employ an iterative approach we multiply the number of operations
by the number of iterations, and finally add the number of operations required for the binomial test, again
a function of the number of reviewers.
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm for detecting opinion spammers from review ratings in a 5-star system. Inputs
for the algorithm are the set of products, reviewers and reviews in the form of product ratings, a required
significance level for the binomial test α, the maximum number of iterations to be run, and the tolerance
threshold τ for terminating the iterative process. Outputs are a p-value (probability reviewer is honest) for
each reviewer and a label honest or spammer based on the calculated p-value and the given significance level
1: Input: reviewers, products, reviews, λ, α, τ , maxIterations
2: Output: for each reviewer r, a spamicity score sr
3: for all r do ur,0 ← 1 #Assume all reviewers are honest
4: for i in [1,maxIterations] do
5: for all products p do #Calculate the weighted mean for each product
6: Rp ← reviewers(p)
7: σp ←
∑
r∈Rp
σr,pur,i
|Rp|
8: for all reviewers r do #Calculate proportion of disagreeing reviews
9: dr,i ← count(σr,p ∈ reviews(r);σr,p < 3 ∧ σp,i ≥ 3 ∨ σr,p ≥ 3 ∧ σp,i < 3)
10: ur,i ← 1−
dr,i
nr
11: if |ur,i−1 − ur,i| < τ ∀i then break #Break if convergence is achieved
12: for all reviewers r do
13: kr ← count(σr,p ∈ reviews(r);σr,p < 3 ∧ σp ≥ 3 ∨ σr,p ≥ 3 ∧ σp < 3)
14: ψr ← P (X ≥ kr;nr, φ) #Apply the binomial test
15: sr ← 1− pr
4. Evaluation
Evaluation of our method consisted of comparison with the recently proposed FraudEagle algorithm
(Akoglu et al., 2013) and application of our approach to a real data set consisting of product reviews pub-
lished on Amazon.com. The FraudEagle algorithm is a network-based approach to the detection of opinion
spam that considers network structure as well as rating scores as part of an iterative message passing
algorithm. FraudEagle has been evaluated against synthetic and real data sets, and has been shown to
outperform a number of similar network-based approaches.
4.1. Comparison with FraudEagle using synthetic data
FraudEagle models product reviews as a bipartite graph, with reviewers and products represented as
vertices and reviews as edges linking reviewers to products. Reviews of products are assumed to have a
binary rating, good or bad. Products are similarly given a binary label, good or bad, depending on the
number of good and bad reviews. FraudEagle also assigns a binary label to each reviewer, being either
honest or fraudulent. FraudEagle takes a set of a parameters describing the probability that a reviewer with
a given label will give a good or bad review of a product that is inherently good or bad (e.g. the probability
that an honest reviewer will give a good product a bad review). FraudEagle applies an iterative message
passing algorithm, whereby the labels on products and reviewers are updated in a manner that maximises
the likelihood of the network configuration (i.e. which reviewers and products have which labels) under the
given probabilities. In this way, FraudEagle also considers deviation from majority opinion and attempts to
discount the contribution of likely spammers. See Akoglu et al. (2013) for further details.
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To compare our approach with FraudEagle we generated two synthetic data sets using two different
models of spammer behaviour. Since FraudEagle considers product reviews as a bipartite graph, these
data sets were generated using a random graph generator, RTG (Akoglu and Faloutsos, 2009). FraudEagle
has been previously evaluated using synthetic data produced using RTG, thus we view RTG as a suitable
generator for our comparison. Using RTG we generated two sets of random bipartite graphs, and for
each graph we then generated a rating score for each edge (vi, vj), representing a review of product j by
reviewer i. In generating these ratings we applied two different models of spammer behaviour, described
below, giving two test sets of synthetic data. For both of these test sets, we applied our approach and
the FraudEagle algorithm to all graphs, combining the results within each set. We then plotted a receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) curve for both sets, using the area under the curve (AUC) as a metric for
performance.
In the context of this paper, the false positive rate for the ROC curve refers to honest reviewers that
are misidentified as spammers, while the true positive rate refers correctly identified spammers. Both our
approach and FraudEagle calculate a spamicity score for each reviewer, and reviewers having a spamicity
score above some threshold are assumed to be spammers. By varying this threshold, different false positive
rates and true positive rates may be achieved. The ROC curve shows the effect of varying this threshold on
the accuracy of each approach. For a given rate of false positives (misidentified honest reviewers), the ROC
curve shows the expected rate of true positives (correctly identified spammers). In attempting to counter
opinion spam, the cost of false positives is likely to be higher than false negatives, as flagging accounts honest
reviewers as spam is likely to cause offence and significant public backlash. Consequently, performance at a
low rate of false positives is important for detection of opinion spam.
Each of the synthetic test sets consisted used for evaluation consisted of 30 random bipartite graphs
generated using RTG. We generated multiple graphs for each data set to minimise the possibility of skewed
results stemming from the use of a random process. Previous evaluation of the FraudEagle algorithm also
used RTG generator, and we used the same parameter values as this evaluation, W = 5000, k = 5, q = 0.4
and β = 0.6 (see Akoglu et al. (2013) and Akoglu and Faloutsos (2009) for details). The mean edge count
for the resulting graphs was 1359. For each of the 30 graphs, we deemed the 7 products with the highest
degree to be ‘famous’. The purpose of the famous products was to simulate spammers attempts to disguise
their behaviour, by publishing honest reviews of well known products.
For the first test set, we followed the same process outlined in Akoglu et al. (2013) for modelling spammer
behaviour. In each graph we assigned the inherent value of all products to be ‘good’ and then randomly
selected 4 reviewers to represent spammers. Ratings posted by the selected spammers were set to ‘bad’
unless the review happened to be directed towards one of the famous products, in which case it was set to
‘good’. For the remaining reviewers, deemed to be honest, all ratings were set to ‘good’.
For our second test set we applied an alternative model of spammer behaviour, which we believe is a more
realistic representation of spammer behaviour. For this test set we calculated the distribution of ratings
from the available set of Amazon product reviews, and using this distribution sampled a random rating for
each edge in each graph, representing the generated reviews. After rating scores had been sampled for all
edges, we randomly selected five reviewers to represent spammers, and the ratings for these five reviewers
were flipped, so that, for example, an initial rating of 5 would be transformed to a 1, a rating of 2 would be
transformed to 4, while a rating of 3 would remain unchanged. We reason that flipping the scores in this
way simulates spammers posting reviews that attempt to drive the average rating away from the majority
opinion. Because FraudEagle only considers a binary rating system we treated ratings of σr,p ≥ 3 to be
‘good’ and ratings of σr,p < 3 to be ‘bad’ as described in Akoglu et al. (2013).
For each of the test sets we ran our iterative process on each network and then performed the binomial
test, obtaining a spamicity score for each reviewer. FraudEagle was also run for each network in each test
set. Within each test set we combined results from all 30 graphs, giving two sets of spamicity scores, one
for each test set. For each of these two sets we then calculated an ROC curve based on the spamicity scores
reported by our approach and by FraudEagle.
Results of our comparison with the FraudEagle algorithm are given in Figure 2, showing the respective
ROC curves. These results show that our approach out-performed FraudEagle on both sets of synthetic
7
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Figure 2: ROC for our approach (blue, solid) and FraudEagle (red, dashed) applied to synthetic data sets using two different
models of spammer behaviour. The left panel represents a binary review system where all products are good, honest reviewers
always give good ratings and spammers always give bad ratings unless reviewing a ‘famous’ product. The AUC is 0.964 for our
approach and 0.940 for FraudEagle. The panel on the right represents behaviour where honest review ratings were drawn from
the global distribution and spammer review ratings were then flipped so that any ratings greater than 3 were transformed to
be less than 3 and vice versa. The AUC is 0.992 for our approach and 0.975 for FraudEagle.
data, with our approach achieving a higher AUC. While this improvement over FraudEagle is marginal for
both data sets, considering the simplicity of our approach compared to the FraudEagle algorithm, we believe
that this comparison clearly demonstrates the viability of our approach. We also note that the ROC curve
shows that our approach achieves a high rate of true positives for low rates of false positives; an important
characteristic given the high cost of false positives in detection of opinion spam.
4.2. Application to Amazon product reviews
We downloaded the Amazon product review data set from http://liu.cs.uic.edu/download/data/
(password required, a link is provided on this page to obtain access, please see Jindal and Liu (2008)). After
removing all reviews with missing fields, this data set consists of 5,838,041 reviews of 1,230,915 products,
published by a total of 2,146,057 reviewers.
To ensure that our data contained a reasonable set of connected reviewers and products, we constructed
a bipartite network from the product review data and extracted the largest connected component. We then
removed all reviewers from this component having less than 3 or more than 5000 reviews, and all products
having only a single review or more than 1000 reviews. We reason that reviewers having more than 5000
reviews are already somewhat suspicious and those having less than 3 reviews require different methods to
detect (e.g. clusters of single positive review, see Wu et al. (2010)). For products having more than 1000
reviews, the mean rating is less likely to be strongly influenced by fake reviews. Products having a single
review obviously prevent any deviation from the majority. After removing products, some reviewers can
become orphaned, therefore we removed reviewers having zero reviews as a final pre-processing step. The
final data set consisted of 5,018,344 reviews of 570,606 products by 1,859,242 reviewers.
To evaluate the performance of our approach, we ran the iterative process described in section 3 on the
Amazon data set. We then applied the binomial test using a significance value of α = 0.05, and selected
those reviewers having a significant number of non-majority reviews as candidate spammers. Since we apply
the test multiple times (once for each reviewer), we used a Bonferonni correction for the significance level,
α = 0.05/nreviewers. After applying the binomial test, we then further filtered the candidate spammers
by removing those candidates having more than 50 reviews. This process resulted in 187 reviewers being
identified as candidate spammers.
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Evaluation of candidate spammers was performed by considering a set of alternative features shown in
other studies to be strong indicators of opinion spam (Jindal and Liu, 2008; Mukherjee et al., 2012, 2013;
Akoglu et al., 2013). In particular, we considered features relating to content similarity (repeated review
text), numerous extreme ratings (1-star or 5-star), and posting of multiple reviews on the same day. Note
that calculation of content similarity is possible in our example data-set, but in many rating systems, review
text would not be present and this feature could not be relied on for identification of spammers.
Figure 3 shows the aggregate behaviour of reviewers for our set of alternative features, taken across a
random sample of reviewers (panel A) and the 187 candidate spammers identified by our approach (panel
B). Also shown is the p-values resulting from a proportional test, described in detail below. This p-value
indicates the statistical significance of the differing behaviour between the random sample of reviewers and
those reviewers identified as spammers using our approach.
To generate the random sample of reviewers, we uniformly sampled 100 random reviewers and then
calculated scores and proportions within this sample. We reasoned that a sample size of 100 reviewers was
a good representation of a set of reviewers identified by some process as high-quality candidate spammers.
To get a reasonable estimate of the average behaviour, we repeated the sampling 100 times, and then took
the mean proportions across each of these samples.
For each candidate we calculated three scores, giving the maximum content similarity between any two of
their reviews, the proportion of reviews occurring with the same date and the proportion of reviews having
extreme ratings. For each of the two groups, we then calculated the proportion of reviewers having scores
greater then a threshold value z, for each of the respective scores. A proportional test was then applied for
each value of z to determine whether or not the observed differences between the two groups was statistically
significant.
As shown in Figure 3, the proportion of reviewers that exhibit high content similarity is significantly
increased amongst those reviewers identified using our approach. The proportion of reviewers publishing
reviews on the same day is also significantly increased amongst these reviewers. Both groups exhibit similar
behaviour with respect to use of extreme ratings, with significant differences only occurring for minimal or
maximal values of z.
Following from our analysis of aggregated behaviour, we also performed a more detailed investigation
of the 20 candidates deemed to be the most likely spammers. Candidate spammers were ranked according
to the proportion of non-majority reviews (reviewers with a greater proportion ranked higher) and the top
20 were selected for further investigation. Similar to our analysis of aggregate behaviour, this investigation
considered review text, rating scores, product categories and the timing of posted reviews. Previous studies
have shown that repeated text, numerous extreme ratings (1-star or 5-star), and posting of multiple reviews
on the same day, particularly within a narrow range of highly similar products, are strong indicators of spam
(Jindal and Liu, 2008; Mukherjee et al., 2012, 2013; Akoglu et al., 2013). Therefore we took occurrences of
these markers as evidence of opinion spam.
Table 1 describes the results of our investigation for the top 20 candidate spammers. We found that of
these top 20, at least 17 were highly likely to be opinion spammers, having some combination of repeated
text, numerous reviews posted on the same day, or large numbers of extreme reviews focused on particular
product groups.
The average running time for our approach was 191 seconds ( 5 million edges, average over 5 runs, single
execution thread on an i5 2.4GHz processor with 8GB RAM). We note for comparison that FraudEagle
is reported to require 100 seconds to perform a single iteration over a graph containing approximately 1
million edges (Akoglu et al., 2013).
5. Discussion and Conclusions
Application of our approach to the Amazon data set shows the proportion of reviews disagreeing with
the mean is a good indicator of spammer behaviour. Our investigation of those reviewers identified as
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Figure 3: Aggregate behaviour of random spammers (A) and candidate spammers identified using deviation from majority
opinion (B), with p-values indicating the significance of observed differences between the two groups (C). Dashed line indicates
a significance of 0.05. Features considered measure reviewers tendency to post reviews on the same day, use of extreme ratings,
and degree of content similarity.
candidate spammers showed strong evidence of spam behaviour. By considering specific features of the
problem domain, namely the desire of spammers to drive mean ratings in a particular direction, we are able
to identify how spammer behaviour differs from the behaviour of honest reviewers. Having identified this
difference we are able to formulate a simple test to detect the relevant behaviour. As a result, a major
advantage of our approach is its simplicity and the consequent minimal computational requirements. Our
approach could easily be combined with other descriptors of spammer behaviour (e.g. timing of reviews
(Xie et al., 2012; Fei et al., 2013), or, if available, text-based features) as part of a more complex classifier,
such as those proposed in Mukherjee et al. (2012, 2013).
In undertaking our investigation of candidate spammers we noted an interesting phenomenon that we
have not seen discussed in previous studies. Many of the reviews published by the top 20 spammers were
highly derogatory and were clearly aimed at a particular subset within a given product range. For exam-
ple, one reviewer had singled out 3 specific female pop artists, all having a similar style of music, and had
written highly negative reviews for multiple albums by each of these artists. It is clear from the review text
that this reviewer has an aversion to this particular style of music, and it seems highly unlikely that this
reviewer had genuinely purchased each of the target albums expecting to enjoy them. Another reviewer
displayed a strong political bias in their rating of books, while another claimed that a particular video game
was the greatest game ever made and posted numerous 1⋆ reviews of other games in the same genre. We
find this type of reviewer to be quite interesting, as the review text in no way attempts to disguise the
reviewers bias and pose as an objective review. We term this type of behaviour agenda spam, whereby
a particular reviewer appears to have a specific political or personal agenda and uses product reviews as
a kind of public (yet anonymous) forum in which to express their views. Note that while these types of
review may not be intended to derive financial benefit, we argue that they still represent a form of spam,
as they pollute the review space with non-objective, highly-biased and, we suggest largely unhelpful, reviews.
While the approach presented in this paper is able to identify opinion spammers, there are a number of
improvements we would like to consider in future work. First, our approach considers a global probability
that a random review will differ from the mean rating. However, calculation of this global probability
currently includes spammer reviews. This probability could instead be treated as a hyper-parameter, being
updated after running the iterative correction of the mean ratings. Second, we use the mean rating as
a measure of majority opinion. In future work, we would like to consider alternative models of majority
opinion, and more detailed descriptions of the distribution of rating scores over each product. Third, we
believe that our approach should be combined with alternative approaches to gain a more comprehensive
detection system. Spammers employ a wide range of strategies, and particular strategies may be more easily
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Table 1: Results of manual investigation of top 20 ranked reviewers. Reviewers were evaluated based on the number of extreme
ratings (1-star or 5-star ratings) awarded, targeting of highly similary product groups (e.g. numerous 1⋆ ratings for a particular
author), presence of repeated text in multiple reviews (at least an entire sentence), and posting of multiple reviews within a
short period of time. Reviewers marked with a star showed little or no corroborating evidence of spam.
Rank # reviews # 1⋆ # 5⋆ Similarity Rep. text Rep. dates Comment
1 42 40 2 F F T Sentiment of text doesn’t
match rating
2 37 35 2 T F T
3 27 27 0 T F T
4 42 40 0 T F T Clearly dislikes style of
music, but numerous re-
views
5 27 25 2 T F T Multiple (10) reviews of
same product with differ-
ent text
6 43 42 1 T T T
7 32 23 2 F F T
8 21 21 0 T F T
9 44 31 6 F F T Username is ’United Fed-
eration of Trolls’, reviews
no longer on Amazon web-
site
10 34 29 3 T T T
11∗ 31 16 3 F F F
12 42 16 0 T F F 1⋆ only on recent pop al-
bums, reviews no longer
on Amazon website
13 39 29 6 T F F Verified purchase only on
5⋆ reviews
14∗ 53 11 2 F F T
15 31 22 9 T F T
16 29 22 6 T T T Numerous 1⋆ reviews di-
rected at single musician
17 37 15 5 T T T Multiple reviews of same
product
18∗ 52 22 12 F T F
19 51 45 5 T T T Strong bias in review text
20 31 22 7 T F T Strong bias in review text
detected using a particular approach. Combining these different approaches in a flexible manner would
provide an effective method for dealing with the multi-faceted nature of spammer behaviour.
In addition to the improvements outlined above, future work will also consider how the type of approach
presented in this paper can be extended to detect groups of spammers acting in a coordinated manner.
Previous work has shown that detection of spammer groups is possible by considering groups of reviewers
having multiple products in common. We suggest that coordinated behaviour amongst reviewers should
be relatively unusual, so that spammer groups may be identified based on their deviation from normal,
uncoordinated behaviour.
Opinion spam is a continuing problem for consumers looking to be guided by online product reviews
in making their purchasing decisions. In this paper we have demonstrated a simple method for detecting
opinion spam based only on reviewer ratings. By applying a binomial test our characterisation of spammer
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behaviour can be used to detect opinion spammers in real data, with results showing improvements over
existing methods. We suggest that the simplicity of our approach is extremely desirable given the volume of
data typically considered for opinion spam and suggest that our characterisation could be easily combined
with other text and non-text based features as part of a multi-criteria system.
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